SYRIA MANAGING A TRANSITION

Ramifications of collapse of state institutions and the army

SUFYAN JAN , 2024 MAR 11

The sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria opens the way to a new Middle East. This path will have, mainly, go through the triumvirate of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel . The renewed resurgence of Islamist and Muslim brotherhood fervor in the region, is an unsettling element to Arab leaders and Israel especially. This essay seeks to summarize and extrapolate on the current problems facing the region and Syria and what may be policy priorities.

· The stability of the country is the linchpin of stability in the wider region. Concerns about a power vacuum in post dictatorships is shared across the region.

· Geopolitical stability is a requirement for the mega projects, economic integration and Indian/Chinese connectivity projects to succeed. Without it there will be no foreign investment.

· The expanding military and economic clout of Turkey in Syria is not welcomed. As Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states require the region not to be dominated by Iran, Turkey or Israel.

· Replacing the “Shia crescent” with a Turkish full moon across the region is not an option. The moderate Arab states will have their interests gobbled up.

· Grave concerns about foreign fighters in the ranks of HTS and other rebel factions. Gulf Arabs, Chechens, Turks, Uyghurs, Uzbeks and others. Regional and international stakeholders will require their repatriation as part of legitimizing the new administration in Damascus and to plow in investments in the ravaged country.

· The proliferation of weapons in the hands of foreign and Arab jihadists, the factions, and dispersed in the hands of people, smugglers and the black market in Syria can threaten to bring down neighbouring regimes in the region.[1]

· International engagement with the new Syrian authorities will hinge on implementing UN resolution 2254, which includes a new constitution, the preservation of political, economic and religious rights of Syria’s diverse social mosaic and for democratic rule to instantiate itself.[2]

In the days since HTS took the capital, causing Assad to flee to Moscow, the predominantly Sunni Arab states have been cautiously engaged. In public statements, they have urged Syrians to maintain state institutions and ensure that the political transition is inclusive.

Assad’s rehabilitation last year with the Arab league countries was two pronged. First, for Iran to have a smaller footprint in the country. Second, to curb Syria’s lucrative and illicit trade in the synthetic stimulant Captagon. In return for his reintegration, Arab countries also expected Assad to engage the more moderate of his political opponents to prevent groups like HTS — which controlled some Syrian territory — from expanding their reach. But Assad did not deliver on any of his promises.

For the Arab countries, and especially Saudi Arabia which carries real bulk geography matters. Iran, Yemen and the Levant are all nearby. Egypt, which had a brief fling with the Muslim brotherhood in 2011, is big, poor and ripe for another explosion. Jordan is equally suffering an economic downturn. So allowing the current Islamist stew to brew in Damascus is not an option. Neither is turning Syria into a bog-standard nomadic takeover state.

With millions of Syrians who know Turkish, the various NGOs, there is a probability that the country will have a Turkish ruling caste (Duel citizens). If so, foreign (Central Asian) Turkish fighters will continue to be recruited into the military and from there offered a path to citizenship.[3]

Tajik Citizen Appointed to High Position in New Syrian Army Under Julani’s HTS

The fear that haunts minorities and the international community’s concerns are not unfounded. Another problematic aspect, of many, is the housing & property rights in Idlib, we see that significant prejudice against minorities persisted under Al-Joulani’s government. This despite recent efforts to break away from the legacy of Salafi jihadism and recognise minorities as equal citizens. Properties of Idlib’s Druze and Christian minorities With the emergence of Jabhat Al-Nusra in Idlib in 2012, Druze and Christian minorities faced campaigns of displacement, repression, and property confiscation, as well as massacres in some instances. While HTS adopted a less hostile approach towards minorities after forming the SSG, it has not fully recognised their rights.[4]

The fall of Assad could also bring broader regional benefits. Assad’s regime facilitated the flow of arms from Iran to Hezbollah; new leadership in Damascus could further reduce Iranian influence and play a constructive role in shaping a more stable regional order. But hope must be tempered by caution. Across the Middle East, the removal of strongmen has generally produced violent chaos, not stable and inclusive governance. During the Assad era, the Alawi minority ruled over a Sunni majority; revenge could be in the offing. More generally, Syria’s diverse population could easily fall prey to the politics of ethnic and sectarian division.

In fact, since well before Assad’s flight, Syria has been a state in name only. its civil war divided the country into numerous fiefdoms that have been under the effective control of often hostile rival groups. One of those groups – Syria’s Kurds – is aligned with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist entity, prompting Turkey to take control of a broad swath of Syria’s north.

Amid these existing fractures, extremist groups could capitalize on the fall of Assad and the resulting turbulence to strengthen their territorial footprint and power. That is what happened in 2014, when the Islamic State was able to seize control of a significant piece of Iraq and Syria as a result of the political mayhem in both countries. Extremist groups could now run the same play, which is why Israel has spent the last few days building a “security zone” beyond its border with Syria and destroying weapons stocks in the country to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.

A case in point is HTS itself, which began life as an affiliate of al-Qaeda, and, like the PKK, is still designated by the United States and other countries as a terrorist group. While HTS’s leaders have pledged moderation and inclusiveness as they seek to fashion a national government, the group has a track record of repression. More broadly, Syria’s contending factions might seek to settle scores, not work together. Iran’s influence in Syria has plunged, but the Islamic Republic will try to retain its leverage as its former proxies – particularly the disenfranchised Alawis, a Shia sect – jockey with rivals for position.

In short, there is a great deal that could go wrong.

Looking ahead, Syria’s trajectory will depend first and foremost on its myriad players’ ability to achieve an inclusive political transition. Rebuilding a functioning state will require the restoration of Syria’s territorial integrity, which in turn will depend on the willingness of multiple territorial stakeholders to share power and sacrifice their autonomy in the interest of national unity. The other key challenge will be forging a new social contract that provides Syrians adequate levels of security and economic opportunity.

Syrians themselves must do most of the hard work, but the international community has an important role to play. For starters, drawing on the harsh lessons learned in Iraq, where the wholesale dismantling of the Ba’ath regime produced violent chaos, outside powers should press the newly empowered opposition groups to refrain from forcibly sidelining the Alawis, who formed the backbone of the Assad regime.

The prospects of a lasting settlement would significantly improve if the Alawi elite were adequately integrated into a diverse governing coalition. Moreover, Turkey and the US should press their Syrian proxies, the Syrian National army and the Syrian Democratic Forces, respectively, to be constructive players and work with, not against, the transitional government.

Outside powers can also help prevent the further collapse of the Syrian state and its economy. Achieving a post-conflict settlement will become all the more difficult if the quality of life continues to deteriorate, and basic services like health care and education are unavailable. It was under precisely such conditions that regime change in Iraq produced radicalization and state failure.

I have never been a student of Türkiye. I am familiar with the country and people only on a very superficial level. Some say they have a well-deserved reputation as notorious double-dealers and back-stabbers — often at the expense of their own best interests. The international community should therefore launch a multilateral aid program that combines humanitarian and financial assistance with capacity-building measures. As hosts to a large number of Syrian refugees, Turkey and the European Union have a keen interest in the early implementation of a multilateral strategy to foster the right social and economic conditions for the safe, voluntary return of the displaced population.

Assad’s fall has created an opportunity for the political and economic reconstruction of a key Arab state and the reshaping of its regional role. But the next few months are critical. The record of efforts to stabilize post-conflict societies in the region is littered with failure. Syria for the past 13 years is a case in point, as are Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. It is time to get one right.

[1] Lebanon ‘flooded’ with Syrian firearms abandoned after army collapse –

The National

[2] Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Syria – UN

[3] Obaidah Arnaout | Syria’s Future, Israeli Aggression & Palestine – Interview

[4] Review of HTS Policies Concerning HLP Rights in Idlib – The Syria report