Antony Sutton's Western technology and Soviet economic development,¹ and the abridged version for the general public, National Suicide,² both reveal that high finance (Wall Street) and agents within the US government facilitated, at the very top (Kissinger, David Rockefeller, Chase Manhattan, et al), the military build-up of Soviet Russia and China. In fact, Rockefeller and Morgan trust alliances dominated not only Wall Street but, through interlocking directorships, almost the entire economic fabric of the United States.

Henry Kissinger was a long-time employee of the Rockefeller family. Under his cattle prod, both Johnson and Nixon administrations allowed the Togliatti (Volgograd) and Kama River plants to be built. U.S Intelligence also knew the military output from Gorki (built by Ford 1929-1933) and ZIL plants (built by A.J Brandt). Both manufactured more than two-thirds of all Soviet vehicles (excluding Togliatti and Kama). Almost all were military vehicles. Successive American administrations also knew. American aid for the construction of large military truck plants was approved in the 1960s and 70s.³

The Volgograd automobile plant, built between 1968 and 1971, had a capacity of 600,000 vehicles per year, three times more than the Ford-built Gorki plant, which up to 1968 had been the largest auto plant in the USSR. Although Volgograd is described in Western literature as the "Togliatti plant" or "Fiat-Soviet auto plant" — and does indeed produce a version of the Fiat-124 sedan — its core technology is American. Three-quarters of the equipment, including key transfer lines and automatics came from the United States.

It is truly extraordinary that a plant with known military potential could have been equipped with technology from the United States in the middle of the Vietnamese War — a war in which the North Vietnamese received 80 percent of their supplies from the Soviet Union.

Up to 1968 American construction of Soviet military truck plants was presented as "peaceful trade." In the late 1960s, Soviet planners decided to build the largest truck factory in the world. This plant, spread over 36 square miles and situated on the Kama River, had an annual output of 100,000 multi-axle 10-ton trucks, trailers, and off-the- road vehicles. It was evident from the outset, given the absence of Soviet technology in the automotive industry, that the design, engineering work, and key equipment for such a facility would have to come from the United States.

In 1972, under President Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, the pretence of "peaceful trade" was abandoned and the Department of Commerce admitted that the proposed Kama plant had military potential (Human Events Dec. 1971). According to a department spokesman, “military capability was taken into account when the export licenses were issued.”

1.1 MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles) Technology

The West faced a truly awesome threat from Soviet missiles. This threat would not have existed if Nixon and Kissinger had heeded Department of Defence warnings in 1970. Experts said the Soviets were lagging in missile production technology and required specific technologies from the West to make viable MIRV technology for their fourth generation ICBMs. MIRV capability is the ability to deploy a number of warheads from the same missile, thus vastly increasing throw weight. Soviet third generation missiles did not have this capability.

The phrase "became available" is a subtle way for DOD to state that the U.S. made the technology available (as shown below). This technological transfer was concealed from the public and continues to this day.⁵

Sutton claimed the Soviets acquired MIRV technology from U.S. sources. This included machining for the manufacture of precision ball bearings needed to mass- produce MIRV–enabled missiles. Congress investigated and published reports on the export of strategic materials to the Soviet Union. One such, labled "a life and death matter" by Congress, was a 1961 shipment of ball bearing machines to the USSR [U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Shipment of Ball Bearing Machines to the U.S.S.R., Washington, 1961].

The Bryant Chucking Grinder Company accepted a Soviet order for thirty-five Centalign-B machines for the processing of miniature ball bearings. All precision ball bearings used by the Department of Defence for missile guidance systems were manfuactured on seventy-two Bryant Centalign Model-B machines. In 1961, the Department of Commerce approved the export of thirty-five machines to the USSR. This would have given the Soviets nearly 50 percent of America’s MIRV capability.

The Soviets had no equipment or means for such mass-production processing. Neither could they nor any European manufacturer have manufactured it at the time. A Department of Commerce statement saying there were other manufacturers was proven to be inaccurate. A concerted effort seems to have been made to give the USSR the ability to use higher-thrust rockets with far greater accuracy and thus pull ahead of the United States. A congressional investigation eventually yielded information not otherwise available to independent non-government researchers and the general public.

1.2 Computer Technology

Perhaps a far more devastating and relevant piece of technology handed to the Soviets were computers that allowed the automation and control of engineering technology. These were central to the development of Russia’s nuclear program. One might consider this similar to the contemporary silicon war between the United States and China. Related civilian and military contributions are discussed below.

The computer revolution was a Western phenomenon. It was relatively absent for Soviets during the late sixties. Even their first-rate scientific institutions lacked advanced machines. Russia’s main atomic energy research institute, for example, directed by the famed physicist, Igor Kurchatov, used a first-generation computer at the Academy of Science to calculate uranium burnup at a time when Argonne Laboratories in America had two second-generation computers. There are several reasons why Soviets were late starters; factors discussed in detail by RW Judy.

By 1957 the party journal, Kommunist, reported "a number of firms are engaged in the production of electronic digital computers in the U.S.A., England, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France," and proudly suggested that a socialist economy could utilize computers with greater effect than capitalist economies. Current planning deficiencies caused by large numbers of manual calculations could then be overcome. In particular, the Kommunist urged, computers should be extended from scientific fields into the ‘planning and management of industry’.

Even if the Soviet dispute over the use of cybernetics was resolved, Soviet progress in computer technology remained extremely weak. At the end of the 1950s the United States had ~5000 computers in use; the Soviets had ~120, nearly the same number as West Germany. Judging the general characteristics of Soviet computers, as reported by well-qualified observers, the technology was far behind and barely out of the first- generation stage as late as the1960s.

The earliest Western computer sale is traced to a Mode1802 National Elliott, sold by Elliott Automation, Ltd., of the United Kingdom in 1959. Elliott Automation was a subsidiary of General Electric.

By the end of the sixties, Soviet computer purchases had been stepped up in a manner similar to the massive purchases of chemical plants in the early sixties. During the last days of 1969, Western computer sales to all of communist Europe, including the U.S.S.R., were running at ~$40 million annually, mostly from subsidiaries of American companies.

For 18 months during 1964–65, Elliott Automation delivered five Model 503 computers to the U.S.S.R., one of which was installed at the Moscow Academy of Sciences. Elliott 503 models ranged in price from $179,000 to more than $1 million, depending on size, with a 131,000-word core capacity. By the end of 1969 GE’s Elliott automation sales to communist countries were four times greater and accounted for no less than one- third of Elliott's computer exports.

GE, through its European subsidiaries (from 1959–1970), sold a broad range of medium-capacity business and scientific computers, including the fastest of the 400 series, which could have been used individually or collectively. The largest single supplier of computers to the U.S.S.R. was International Computers and Tabulation, Ltd., again, out of the UK, a firm whose technology was largely independent of U.S. patents.

In November 1969, five of their 1900 series computers (valued at $12 million) were sold to the U.S.S.R. These were large, high-speed units with integrated circuits. Without question, they were considerably ahead of anything the Soviets were able to manufacture, and were capable of being utilized to solve military and space navigation problems.

1.3 Treaty Negotiations: Undermining American Diplomacy

The Soviet-American Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 is another case where the United States could not resist giving the lion's share to the Soviets. The treaty limited each nation to two ABM sites, one for each capital (Moscow and Washington) and the other at any other location. On the surface this appeared to be rigid equality but the least reflection suggests that America could not have given away more if it had tried. The treaty exchanged the defence of a trash heap of waste paper and empty buildings—what Washington would have amounted to in the event of attack—for the defence of the most important military-industrial complex in the USSR.

An atom bomb dropped on Washington DC would not have inhibited America’s defence effort for two reasons: all government personnel would have been evacuated and Washington has no industry. On the other hand, an atom bomb on Moscow would effectively remove the key centre of Soviet defences. Under Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), Moscow was therefore given an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system as a free gift.

For example, the Ford-built MZMA plant in Moscow is the USSR’s largest producer of automobiles and second-largest producer of trucks. The ZIL plant is a producer of military trucks in Moscow. Of nineteen plants in the Soviet Union making computers and mechanical apparatus for calculation, twelve were in Moscow (the largest computer plant being in Kiev).

Large aircraft and electronics plants were located south of Moscow, including the Fili complex. Moscow was the most important single element of the Soviet military- industrial complex (Soviet Trade Directory, Flegon Press, 1964).

In other words, in the event of war, if there was one obvious target in Russia, it is Moscow. Other targets do not amount to a hill of beans. However, if there was one target in America the Soviets would not go for, it is Washington DC. US government magicians exchanged the protection of nothing in the United States for the protection of the Soviet military-industrial complex with Senate approval.

… to be continued